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PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Third Judicial District Court, Judge Michael R.
Murphy, consolidated two petitions for writs of habeas corpus
brought by Oliver Benjamin Gerrish, Jr. and then summarily
dismissed the consolidated case.

The named parties to the first

petition were Mr. Gerrish, petitioner, and Victoria Palacios,
Paul Boyden, Gary Webster and M. Eldon Barnes, respondents.

The

named parties to the second petition were Mr. Gerrish,
petitioner, and the State of Utah, M. Eldon Barnes, respondent.
There were no unnamed parties to either petition.
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals summarily affirmed
the dismissal of at least one of the petitions.

The named

parties to that petition and to the appeal were Mr. Gerrish,
petitioner and appellant, and the State of Utah, M. Eldon Barnes,
respondent and appellee.

There were no unnamed parties to the

appeal.
The subject of the appeal in this Court is the petition
that named the State of Utah, M. Eldon Barnes, as the respondent.
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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to sections 78-2-2(5) and 78-2a-4 of the Utah Code
because the Court granted Mr, Gerrish's petition for a writ of
certiorari.
1991); (see

See Utah Code Ann. SS 78-2-2(5), 78-2a-4 (Supp.
Addenda A [R. 12/90 at 177], B).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1.

Issue:

Did the court of appeals and the district

court err in refusing to consider the merits of Mr. Gerrish's
habeas corpus petition on the grounds that the petition was
successive and procedurally barred even though Mr. Gerrish had
been denied the opportunity to raise his claims in a direct
appeal and the merits of his claims had never been fully
considered in prior post-conviction proceedings?
Standard of Review:

Because the district court

summarily dismissed the petition on procedural grounds, it made
no factual determinations.

And of course, the court of appeals

made no factual determinations in summarily affirming the
district court's order of dismissal.
presents questions of law only.

Therefore, this issue

This Court should not accord the

legal conclusions underlying either of the lower courts'
decisions any deference, but should instead review them for
correctness.

See, e.g., Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549

(Utah 1989) .
2.

Issue: Was Mr. Gerrish's guilty plea

constitutionally defective because it was made with ineffective

assistance of counsel, where Mr. Gerrish's trial counsel was not
competent to handle the case and had a conflict of interest?
Standard of Review;
question of law only.

This issue presents a

This Court should determine as a matter of

law whether the record can support any conclusion other than
prejudicial ineffective assistance.

See, e.g., Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
3.

Issue: Was Mr. Gerrish's guilty plea

constitutionally defective because it was not made knowingly and
voluntarily, where the sentencing consequences of the plea were
not clearly and unequivocally explained to him?
Standard of Review:
question of law only.

This issue presents a

This Court should review the explanations

of the sentence contained in the record and determine whether
those explanations are sufficient as a matter of law.

See, e.g.,

State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989).
4.

Issue: Was Mr. Gerrish's guilty plea

constitutionally defective because it was not made knowingly and
voluntarily, where the State breached its agreement to recommend
a three year sentence?
Standard of Review:

This issue presents a

question of law only because the record establishes the State's
agreement and its breach.

Therefore, this Court should find that

the plea was involuntary as a matter of law.
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Cf., State v.

Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988)(if the record is not clear,
the appellate court should remand for an evidentiary hearing).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in pertinent part;
No person shall be . • . deprived of . . .
liberty . . . without due process of law.
U.S. Const, amend. V.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in pertinent part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to . . . have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.
U.S. Const, amend. VI.
The fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides in pertinent part:
No State shall . . . deprive any person of .
. . liberty . . . without due process of law.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
Section 4 of article I of the Utah Constitution
provides in pertinent part:
There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State or
interfere with its functions.
Utah Const, art. I, § 4.
Section 7 of article I of the Utah Constitution
provides in pertinent part:
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No person shall be deprived of . . .
liberty . . . without due process of law.
Utah Const, art. I, S 7.
Section 12 of article I of the Utah Constitution
provides in pertinent part:
In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel . . . .
Utah Const, art. I, § 12.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(5)(e) provides in
pertinent part:
The court . . . may not accept [a guilty]
plea until the court has found:
. . . .

(e) the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him
for each offense to which a plea is entered.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5)(e).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal on certiorari from a Utah Court of
Appeals decision that summarily affirmed the Third Judicial
District Court, Judge Michael R. Murphy's, summary dismissal of a
pro se habeas corpus petition filed by petitioner and appellant
Oliver Benjamin Gerrish, Jr.

Both decisions were based on the

grounds that Mr. Gerrish's attack on his guilty plea was
successive and procedurally barred.
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Mr. Gerrish seeks reversal of both the court of
appeals' and Judge Murphy's decisions on the grounds that unusual
circumstances require consideration on the merits of his
ineffective assistance of counsel and other involuntary plea
claims because he has had no opportunity to raise these claims in
a direct appeal and their merits have never been fully
considered.

Mr. Gerrish's guilty plea should be vacated and his

conviction should be reversed because he received ineffective
assistance of counsel and because his guilty plea was not made
knowingly and voluntarily.

In the alternative, Mr. Gerrish's

habeas corpus petition should be remanded to the district court
with the following instructions.

The district court should grant

Mr. Gerrish's appointed pro bono counsel leave to amend the
petition.

After amendment, the district court should hold an

evidentiary hearing to determine whether Mr. Gerrish received
ineffective assistance of counsel and whether his guilty plea was
made knowingly and voluntarily.
Nature of Proceedings Below
Judge Murphy consolidated two habeas corpus petitions
filed by Mr. Gerrish and then dismissed the consolidated case on
two grounds.

First, Judge Murphy concluded that the attack on

Mr. Gerrish's guilty plea raised by one of the petitions should
have been raised on direct appeal and that no unusual
circumstances justified Mr. Gerrish's failure to do so.
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Second,

Judge Murphy concluded that the petition was successive without
good cause because Mr, Gerrish had previously filed two other
habeas corpus petitions.

(See Addenda C-H [R. 2/91 at 2-18, R.

12/90 at 2-8, id- at 143-44, id. at 153, id. at 23-34, id. at
167-68]).
Even though Judge Murphy entered two different orders
of dismissal, neither refers to the other petition, which
challenged a board of pardons action.

(See Addenda D-G).

That

makes some sense because the State opposed the petition
challenging the board action on the merits rather than on
procedural grounds.

(See Addendum I [R. 12/90 at 12-18]).

For

these reasons, it is not clear whether Judge Murphy intended to
dismiss both petitions when he summarily dismissed the
consolidated case. At any rate, the appeal from that dismissal
appears to have been limited to the petition attacking the guilty
plea.1

(See Addenda C, J, K [R. 12/90 at 170-71]).
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal in a

per curiam opinion, on its own motion for summary disposition.
(See Addendum K).

Contrary to the district court's ruling, the

court of appeals did not state that Mr. Gerrish should have

x

This appeal is similarly limited to the habeas corpus
petition attacking the guilty plea, not only because that was the
only petition considered in the court of appeals, but also because
that was the only petition of the two consolidated petitions that
was placed in issue by Mr. Gerrish's pro se petition for a writ of
certiorari. (See Addendum B).
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attacked his guilty plea on direct appeal.

Instead, it held that

he had "pursued the same ground for relief in a prior
adjudication" and had "not demonstrated unusual circumstances
that warrant relitigation of the same ground for relief."

(Id.).

The court of appeals based that conclusion on the following
observations.

Mr. Gerrish had filed a previous habeas corpus

petition attacking his guilty plea that was summarily dismissed
on procedural grounds.

(See id.). Mr. Gerrish had appealed that

dismissal and this Court had dismissed the appeal for lack of
prosecution.

Mr

(See id..)*

his guilty plea.

* Gerrish had also moved to withdraw

(See id.).

The district court had denied the

motion and the court of appeals had summarily affirmed its
denial.

(See id.).
Statement of Facts

The Arrest and Conviction
Mr. Gerrish was arrested for aggravated sexual abuse of
a child in violation of section 76-5-404.1 of the Utah Code on or
about August 29, 1985.

(See Addenda L, M at 50). Shortly before

his arrest, Mr. Gerrish discussed the matter with his neighbor
Harlan Y. Hammond, an attorney engaged in corporate, domestic,
and estate-planning work.

(Addendum M at 14-17).

Even though

Mr. Hammond had virtually no experience in criminal defense work
and was a member of the same ward, or congregation, of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (the "LDS Church") as the
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alleged victims, he offered to represent Mr. Gerrish in entering
a guilty plea.2

(Addendum M at 14-16, 25, 33-34).

Mr. Gerrish

accepted the offer.
Mr. Hammond then appeared for Mr. Gerrish at his
circuit court arraignment on September 11, 1985 and waived a
preliminary hearing.

(Addenda M at 17-18, Mc). Mr. Gerrish was

bound over to the Third Judicial District Court where the case
was assigned to Judge Timothy R. Hanson.

(See Addenda Mc, N).

Before Mr. Gerrishfs district court arraignment, Mr.
Hammond discussed a proposed plea agreement with two different
prosecutors, Leslie A. Lewis and Karen Knight-Eagan.
Addenda M at 20, N at 4).

(See

The substance of the proposed

agreement was that Mr. Gerrish would plead guilty to one count of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child in exchange for dismissal of
the two remaining counts, assurances that other charges then
known to the prosecutors would not be filed, and that the
prosecutors would recommend a sentence of three years.

(See

Addenda M at 20-22, 0). Mr. Hammond relayed these terms to Mr.
Gerrish, who agreed to them.

(See Addendum M at 22). Both Mr.

Hammond and Mr. Gerrish understood the promised three year

2

Mr. Hammond testified several years later that he would not
have offered to represent Mr. Gerrish had he thought that the
representation would require a "complete defense." (Addendum M at
16).
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sentence to mean that Mr. Gerrish would serve only three years.
(Addendum M at 21-22, 48).
On September 23, 1985, Mr. Hammond appeared on behalf
of Mr. Gerrish at his district court arraignment.

Although the

case had been assigned to Ms. Lewis, Ms. Knight-Eagan appeared
for the State.

(Addenda L, N at 4). The plea agreement was

discussed briefly at that hearing, but no plea was entered.

Mr.

Hammond, unaware of the need for a plea affidavit, had not
prepared one and failed to return to the courtroom following a
recess that had been granted for the purpose of preparing an
affidavit.

(See Addenda M at 23, N). The arraignment was

continued to September 25, 1985. By that time, the plea
affidavit had been prepared by Mr. Hammond, with interlineations
apparently made by Ms. Knight-Eagan, and had been signed by Mr.
Gerrish.

(See Addenda M at 44-45, 0, P).
The plea affidavit was, however, incorrect in two very

important respects.

First, it did not accurately state the

sentence that could be imposed under section 76-5-404.1, a
minimum mandatory term of three, six or nine years.

See Utah

Code Ann. $ 76-5-404.1 (Supp. 1986); id. (Supp. 1985); id. (Supp.
1984), (attached as Addendum Q). Instead, it inexplicably stated
that the permissible sentence was a minimum mandatory term of
five, ten or fifteen years.

(Addendum 0). Second, it failed to
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state the third condition for the plea, the promise to recommend
a three year sentence.

(Addendum 0).

The confusion about the sentence continued during the
plea hearing on September 25, 1985. Judge Hanson repeated the
affidavit's erroneous statement that the permissible sentence was
a minimum mandatory term of five, ten or fifteen years.
mentioned the promised three year sentence.
25, P at 2-11).

No one

(See Addenda M at

Although the reasons for Mr. Hammond's silence

or the prosecutors'3 silence are not known, one of the reasons
for Mr. Gerrish's silence is. He believed that he should not
mention the promised sentence, because Judge Hanson already knew
all about it.

(See Addendum M at 48-49).

Mr. Gerrish pled guilty to one count of aggravated
sexual abuse of a child.

Mr. Hammond requested a presentence

report and sentencing was set for October 21, 1985.

(See

Addendum P at 2-11).
The Sentence and Appeal
The confusion surrounding the sentence continued
throughout the sentencing hearing.

There was some discussion

that the permissible sentence might actually be a minimum
mandatory term of eight, thirteen or eighteen years.
Addendum P at 16-19).

(See

Ms. Knight-Eagan requested that Judge

3

The State was represented at that hearing by E. Neil
Gunnarson and Ms. Knight-Eagan. (Addendum P).
-10-

Hanson impose what she apparently believed was the shortest
permissible sentence, a minimum mandatory sentence of five years.
(Id. at 20-21).

Judge Hanson then sentenced Mr. Gerrish to a

minimum mandatory term of ten years, citing a lack of mitigating
factors sufficient to justify a shorter term.

(.Id. at 21-22).

Following the imposition of that ten year sentence, Mr.
Gerrish asked Mr. Hammond what had happened to his three year
sentence.

(Addendum M at 39). Mr. Hammond "responded that the

court had entered its edict."

(Id. at 39-40).

By a letter dated November 5, 1985, the Utah Board of
Pardons notified Judge Hanson that section 76-5-404.1 did not
permit the ten year sentence imposed and asked him to correct the
sentence.

(Addendum R). Judge Hanson amended the sentence on

November 15, 1985 to a minimum mandatory term of six years
without Mr. Gerrish or counsel present.

(Addenda S, T at 4).

On February 18, 1986, Judge Hanson held another
sentencing hearing, sua sponte.

(See Addendum T at 4). Mr.

Gerrish was present and was represented by appointed counsel, Jo
Carol Nesset-Sale.

(See id. at 3-5). Ernest W. Jones

represented the State.

(See Addendum T). Ms. Nesset-Sale had

previously filed a motion to declare the minimum mandatory
sentencing scheme of section 76-5-404.1 unconstitutional.
id. at 5). That motion was argued briefly and denied.
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(See

(See id.

at 5-9). Judge Hanson resentenced Mr. Gerrish to a minimum
mandatory term of six years.

(Addendum T at 9).

Ms. Nesset-Sale then brought an appeal from the denial
of that motion on Mr. Gerrishfs behalf.
12/90 at 57-72]).
constitutional.

(See Addendum U [R.

This Court upheld the sentence as
See State v. Gerrish, 746 P.2d 762 (Utah 1987).

The Prior Habeas Corpus Petitions
In the spring or summer of 1987, Mr. Gerrish filed a
pro se habeas corpus petition in the Third Judicial District
Court.

(Addendum V [R. 12/90 85-92]).

The grounds for that

petition included the bases for this appeal, ineffective
assistance of counsel and an involuntary guilty plea.

(See id.).

On or about September 16, 1987, Judge Homer F. Wilkinson
dismissed the petition on the ground that Mr. Gerrish had not
previously moved to withdraw his guilty plea.

(See Addendum W

[R. 12/90 at 94-95]).
Shortly after Judge Wilkinson had dismissed that habeas
corpus petition, Mr. Gerrish filed a pro se motion, dated
September 26, 1987, in this Court seeking reversal of his
conviction and sentence on the same grounds.
12/90 at 74-78]).

(Addendum XY [R.

On October 19, 1987, this Court dismissed that

motion, referring to it as a habeas corpus petition.
[R. 12/90 at 80]).
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(Addendum Z

Mr. Gerrish then attempted to appeal from Judge
Wilkinson's decision by filing a pro se notice of appeal and a
pro se petition for interlocutory appeal, both dated January 24,
1988.

(Addendum 1 [R. 12/90 at 97-100]).

This Court denied the

petition for interlocutory appeal and dismissed the appeal
commenced by the untimely notice.

(Addendum 2 [R. 12/90 at 102,

104]).
In 1988, Mr. Gerrish filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah.

(See Addendum 3 [R. 12/90 at 106-07, 109-19]).

The grounds for that petition also included the bases for this
appeal, ineffective assistance of counsel and an involuntary
guilty plea.

(See id. at 6).

On May 3, 1989, the federal court

dismissed the petition on the ground that Mr. Gerrish had not
exhausted his state court remedies because the only issue ever
resolved by this Court was the constitutionality of the minimum
mandatory sentencing scheme.

(See id. at 6-9).

Immediately following the dismissal of that petition in
1989, Mr. Gerrish filed another pro se habeas corpus petition,
dated May 24, 1989, in the Third Judicial District Court.
(Addendum 4 [R. 12/90 at 121-28]).

The grounds for that petition

again included the bases for this appeal, ineffective assistance
of counsel and breach of a plea agreement.

(See id. at 2-5).

Judge John A. Rokich dismissed the petition as successive and
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procedurally barred.

(Addendum 5 [R. 12/90 at 130-32]).

Although Mr. Gerrish apparently filed a pro se appeal of Judge
Rokich's decision, this Court dismissed the appeal for lack of
prosecution.

(See Addendum 6 [R. 12/90 at 134]).

The Bar Disciplinary Proceedings
Mr. Gerrish sent a letter of complaint against his
trial counsel, Mr. Hammond, to the Utah State Bar.
7).

(See Addendum

In response to that complaint, the Screening Panel of the

Bar's Ethics and Discipline Committee found that Mr. Hammond had
violated two ethical rules in his representation of Mr. Gerrish.
(Id.).

Mr. Hammond violated the rule that prohibits lawyers from

handling matters that they know or should know they are not
competent to handle.

(id.).

"Mr. Hammond was not sufficiently

familiar with the criminal law relating to your sexual abuse
charge and the sentencing phase."

(id.).

Mr. Hammond also

violated the rule that prohibits lawyers from handling matters
when they have conflicts of interest.

(id.).

"Mr. Hammond

displayed some bias about the ultimate sentencing outcome of the
criminal charge against you and . . . improperly confused his
professional role and his ecclesiastical role and failed to act
properly in his role as an attorney."

(id.).

As a result of

these violations, Mr. Hammond received a private reprimand.
id., Addendum M at 32-33).
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(See

The Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea
After learning the outcome of the Bar proceedings, Mr.
Gerrish filed a pro se motion to set aside his guilty plea, dated
May 6, 1989.

(Addendum 8 [R. 12/90 at 136]).

After appointing

counsel for Mr. Gerrish and holding an evidentiary hearing, Judge
Timothy R. Hanson denied that motion.

The grounds for denial

were that upon "review of the record as a whole . . . the Court
is satisfied that the defendant entered his plea knowingly,
intelligently with full understanding of the rights that he was
giving up, and of the potential consequences of the entry of the
plea."

(Addendum 9 at 2, 3 [R. 12/90 at 138-41]).

(See Addenda

M, 8, 9). Mr. Gerrish appealed Judge Hanson's decision to this
Court.

(See Addendum 10).

On appeal, Mr. Gerrish argued that

the "record as a whole" test was not the correct standard.
id.).

(See

This Court assigned the appeal to the court of appeals,

which summarily affirmed.

(See id.).

Shortly after Judge Hanson

denied Mr. Gerrish's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Mr.
Gerrish filed the habeas corpus petition that gave rise to this
appeal.

(See Addendum C).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Gerrish's case has more closely resembled a plot

concocted by Franz Kafka than a fair judicial proceeding.

Since

Mr. Gerrish first entered his plea almost six years ago, the
merits of its constitutional validity have received only one
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rather abbreviated hearing.

At almost every turn, Mr. Gerrish's

claims have been denied consideration on conflicting and
confusing procedural grounds.

It is time that those claims be

given a full and fair hearing.
Mr. Gerrish's plea was involuntary for three reasons.
It was made with the ineffective assistance of counsel who was
incompetent to handle the case and who had a conflict of
interest.

The sentence that could actually be imposed as a

consequence of his guilty plea was not clearly and unequivocally
explained to Mr. Gerrish.

The State breached its agreement to

recommend a three year sentence in exchange for the plea.
Because Mr. Gerrish has already spent approximately six years in
prison on the basis of that constitutionally defective guilty
plea, this Court should vacate the plea anrf reverse his
conviction, with prejudice.
ARGUMENT
1.

Mr. Gerrish's Petitions Must be Decided on the
Merits Because he had no Opportunity to Raise his
Claims on Direct Appeal and They Have not Been
Fully Considered in any Other Proceeding.

"Habeas corpus proceedings may be used to attack a
judgment or conviction on the ground that an obvious injustice or
a substantial denial of a constitutional right occurred at
trial."

Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989)(citing

Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 804 (Utah 1988); Brown v. Turner,
21 Utah 2d 96, 98-99, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (1968)).
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A habeas corpus

petition may properly raise a claim that the petitioner was
denied the constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel at trial and on appeal.

See, e.g.,

Dunn v. Cook. 791

P.2d 873 (Utah 1990); Jensen v. DeLand, 795 P.2d 619 (Utah
1989)("if counsel's deficiencies were sufficiently grievous to
deprive the plaintiff of effective assistance of counsel, they
constitute a violation of due process that is clearly reviewable
by habeas corpus"); Fernandez, 783 P.2d 547. A habeas corpus
petition may also properly raise a claim that due process was
denied because a plea agreement was breached or was involuntary
because the benefits of the plea were not clearly explained.
See, e.g., Martinez v. Smith, 602 P.2d 700 (Utah 1979); Summers
v. Cook, 759 P.2d 341 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Absent "unusual circumstances," however, a petitioner
may not raise issues in a habeas corpus petition that could or
should have been raised in a direct appeal.

See, e.g.,

Fernandez, 783 P.2d at 549 (citing Bundv, 763 P.2d at 804; Wells
v. Shulsen, 747 P.2d 1043, 1044 (Utah 1987); Codianna v. Morris,
660 P.2d 1101, 1104-05 (Utah 1983); Brown, 21 Utah 2d at 98-99,
440 P.2d at 969). Denial of the opportunity to raise an issue in
a direct appeal constitutes an "unusual circumstance" that
justifies raising the issue for the first time in a habeas corpus
petition.

E.g., Dunn, 791 P.2d 873; Jensen, 795 P.2d 619;

Fernandez, 783 P.2d 547; Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah
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1980); Waastaff v, Barnes, 802 P.2d 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Such a denial occurs when a petitioner's trial counsel advises
against an appeal and the petitioner follows that advice.

E.g.,

Chess, 617 P.2d 341. The same denial occurs even if the
petitioner does bring an appeal and even if the petitioner is
represented by different attorneys at trial and on appeal, if
appellate counsel advises against raising a claim and the advice
is followed.

E.g., Jensen, 795 P.2d 619.

Although Mr. Gerrish's petition attacks his conviction
on the ground that his constitutional rights to the effective
assistance of counsel and due process were violated, the petition
was dismissed because those issues could and should have been
raised on direct appeal.

The district court erred in dismissing

the petition on that basis because Mr. Gerrish never had the
opportunity to raise the issues in a direct appeal.
As the federal court has noted, Mr. Gerrish never
actually had a direct appeal.

(Addendum 3 at 2 n.l).

His trial

counsel was not willing to represent him on appeal and advised
against an appeal.
that advice.

(Addendum M at 51).

Mr. Gerrish followed

(Id. at 70). Under Chess, Mr. Gerrish was thus

denied the opportunity to raise his claims on direct appeal.
That denial constitutes an unusual circumstance that justifies
raising those claims for the first time in a habeas corpus
petition.
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The appeal concerning Mr. Gerrish's case that this
Court has previously resolved was not a direct appeal, but an
appeal from denial of a motion to declare minimum mandatory
sentencing unconstitutional.

After the error in Mr. Gerrish's

sentence was discovered, Jo Carol Nesset-Sale was appointed to
represent him on resentencing.

(See Addendum T).

Prior to the

hearing on resentencing, Ms. Nesset-Sale filed a motion to
declare the minimum mandatory sentencing scheme of Utah Code
section 76-5-404.1 unconstitutional.

(See Addenda T, U ) . The

trial court denied the motion and sentenced Mr. Gerrish to a
minimum mandatory term of six years to life.

(See Addendum T ) .

Ms. Nesset-Sale then filed an appeal from the denial of the
motion.

(See Addendum U).
There is no indication that Ms. Nesset-Sale was

appointed to represent Mr. Gerrish for any other purpose or that
Ms. Nesset-Sale and Mr. Gerrish ever discussed any other issues.
In fact, Mr. Gerrish never saw or spoke with Ms. Nesset-Sale
except at the resentencing hearing.

(See Addendum M at 69-70).

Thus, Ms. Nesset-Sale's appointment did not afford Mr. Gerrish
any opportunity to raise his claims on direct appeal.

This

situation is somewhat analogous to that in Jensen, where new
appellate counsel advised against raising a claim that trial
counsel was ineffective, because the context of Ms. Nesset-Sale's
appointment effectively foreclosed raising a similar claim or any
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claim other than the challenge to the constitutionality of
minimum mandatory sentencing.
Just as "unusual circumstances" are required to justify
habeas corpus review of issues that should have been raised on
direct appeal, "good cause" is required to justify habeas corpus
review of issues that should have been raised in a prior habeas
corpus or other similar proceeding.

State v. West, 765 P.2d 891,

894 (Utah 1988)(citing Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i)(2), (4)). The
standards imposed by both the "unusual circumstances" and "good
cause" requirements appear to be the same.

E.g., West, 765 P.2d

at 893-95; Dunn, 791 P.2d at 879 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in
the result).
Mr. Gerrish has filed several pro se petitions for
habeas corpus and made a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
(See Addenda V, XY, 3, 4, 8). Not one of those habeas corpus
petitions has been considered on the merits.

(See Addenda W, Z,

3, 5). His pro se attempts to appeal the summary dismissals of
those petitions have met with no success.

(See Addenda 1, 2, 6).

He was represented on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and
an evidentiary hearing was held.

(See Addendum M).

However, as

the transcript of that hearing and Judge Hanson's memorandum
decision and findings of fact and conclusions of law demonstrate,
the issues raised in Mr. Gerrish's petitions were not fully
considered.

(See Addenda 9). For example, even though the issue
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of Mr. Hammond's conflict of interest was raised, it was not
dealt with at all.

(See Addendum M at 16, 25, 32). Mr. Gerrish

filed a pro se appeal from the denial of that motion, but did not
base the appeal on any grounds relevant to the issues raised in
the habeas corpus petition in the present case.

(See Addendum

10).
It would be unfair and absurd to expect someone in Mr.
Gerrish's position to have the ability to state and pursue his
claims properly without the assistance of counsel.

This Court

should not hold that Mr. Gerrish's prior efforts to do so
foreclose the opportunity to have his claims properly presented
by counsel for full and fair consideration.
2.

Mr. Gerrish's Guilty Plea was not Made Knowingly
and Voluntarily Because he Received Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel as a Result of his Lawyer's
Conflict of Interest and Incompetence.

The sixth amendment to the United State Constitution
and section 12 of article I of the Utah Constitution guarantee
the right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal
prosecutions.

See, e.g.. Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 877 (Utah

1990); U.S. Const, amend. VI.; Utah Const, art. I, S 12.
Challenges to convictions based on ineffectiveness of counsel are
evaluated under the following two-part test:

(1) did counsel

render "a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner,
which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment," and (2) did "counsel's performance
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[prejudice] the defendant.-

Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805

(Utah 1988Uciting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690
(1984)).

The same test applies when the conviction is based on a

guilty plea.

E.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).

Generally, this Court will not consider the
reasonableness of counsel's performance without first determining
that the defendant was prejudiced.
P.2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1987).

See State v. Archuletta, 747

However, if a defendant

demonstrates that counsel "actively represented conflicting
interests" and "an actual conflict of interest adversely affected
his lawyer's performance," this Court must presume prejudice.4
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (quoting Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S.
335, 350 (1980)).

4

The reasons for presuming prejudice when there is an actual
conflict of interest are fundamental.
In those circumstances, counsel breaches the
duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of
counsel's duties. Moreover, it is difficult
to measure the precise effect on the defense
of representation corrupted by conflicting
interests. Given the obligation of counsel
to avoid conflicts of interest and the
ability of trial courts to make early inquiry
in certain situations likely to give rise to
conflicts, . . . it is reasonable for the
criminal justice system to maintain a fairly
rigid rule of presumed prejudice for
conflicts of interest.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (citing Cuvler v.
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350 (1980)).
-22-

Under that rule, the Court should presume prejudice in
this case because Mr. Hammond actively represented the interest
of the alleged victims and their parents in obviating the need
for the children to testify.

As Mr. Hammond has testified, he

lived in the same neighborhood and attended the same LDS Church
congregation as did the alleged victims and their parents.
(Addendum M at 25). Although he did not recall being acquainted
with the children, he knew their parents.

(id.).

In

disciplinary proceedings that arose from Mr. Hammond's
representation of Mr. Gerrish, the Utah State Bar appears to have
determined that Mr. Hammond held an ecclesiastical office that
resulted in conflicting duties to the alleged victims and Mr.
Gerrish.

(See Addendum 7). The Bar also appears to have

determined that Mr. Hammond confused his roles as Mr. Gerrish's
ecclesiastical and legal adviser.

(id.).

The Bar further

determined that these conflicts adversely affected Mr. Hammond's
performance, noting that Mr. Hammond was "biased" about the
sentence.5

(id.).

5

A1 though bar disciplinary action does not, without more,
require a conclusion of ineffectiveness, e.g., United States v.
Mouzin, 785 F.2d 682, 696-97 (9th Cir. 1986), when a lawyer is
reprimanded for the very conduct in question, it is evidence that
the lawyer's performance was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 688 ("Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar
Association standards and the like . . . are guides to determining
what is reasonable, but they are only guides."); Schoonover v.
State, 218 Kan. 377, 543 P.2d 881, 886, cert, denied, 424 U.S. 944
(1975). Violation of ethical rules, especially the rule against
representing conflicting interests, tends to "show actual errors
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Mr. Hammond even indicated that in his view, one of the
main reasons for Mr. Gerrish's guilty plea was to prevent the
alleged victims from having to testify.

(Addendum M at 16, 36).

While this may have been Mr. Hammond's priority in his
ecclesiastical role and certainly would have been the priority of
the children and their parents, it is not plausible that it was
Mr. Gerrish's main concern to the exclusion of all others.
Although Mr. Hammond attempted to attribute the same priority to
Mr. Gerrish, he admitted that Mr. Gerrish had not expressed it as
his overriding concern.

(Id.).

These conflicts resulted in Mr. Hammond's cavalier
attitude about representing Mr. Gerrish in general and
specifically about the sentence that Mr. Gerrish would and did
receive on pleading guilty.

(See Addendum M at 16, 36, 40-41).

As demonstrated below in part 3 of this argument, Mr. Hammond
failed to determine or explain to Mr. Gerrish what sentence could
actually be imposed.

There can be no justification for a

lawyer's failing to study and explain the statute under which a
client has been charged.

Therefore, this Court should not only

presume prejudice, it should also find Mr. Hammond's
representation deficient and should vacate Mr. Gerrish's guilty
plea on the grounds that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

and omissions by counsel that a conscientious advocate would not
have made, and which prejudiced" the defendant. Mouzin, 785 F.2d
at 696; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
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There is an independent reason, based on state
constitutional grounds, that this Court should find Mr. Hammond's
representation deficient and presume prejudice.

Mr. Hammond's

representation of conflicting interests with religious overtones
in a State criminal prosecution violates section 4 of article I
of the Utah Constitution.

That provision prohibits religious

domination of or interference in state functions.

Utah Const,

art. I, S 4.
In addition to serving as a client's advocate, every
attorney is an officer of the court.

E.g., Barnard v. Utah State

Bar, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (No. 880201 Mar. 21, 1991).

An

attorney who represents a defendant in a criminal prosecution
conducted by the State in state court plays a very important role
in one of the State's most important and serious functions.
Therefore, the plain language of section 4 and common sense both
demand that a defendant's attorney perform this role without
church-based conflicts of interest.

When a defendant's attorney

violates this principle, this Court should find that attorney's
performance deficient, should presume prejudice and should vacate
the defendant's guilty plea or conviction.

Any other rule would

allow the religious interference that section 4 prohibits.
Both the Utah history behind section 4 and sound public
policy support the same rule.
certain extent a church-state.

Prior to statehood, Utah was to a
See E. Firmage & R. Mangrum, Zion
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in the Courts: A Legal History of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-dav Saints, 1830-1900 263-78 (1988)(attached as Addendum
11).

During this period, the LDS Church strongly promoted

arbitration and mediation of disputes.

(Id. at 262-78).

The LDS

Church had its own legal system and strongly discouraged its
members from resorting to secular courts.
was true even in criminal matters.

(JEd. at 263-78).

This

(Id. at 267). The church

legal system was a mechanism for the LDS Church to exert great
influence in secular affairs.

The church courts heard complaints

against LDS civil officials and then issued decrees instructing
them on the proper performance of their civil duties in
accordance with church teachings,

(id. at 276-78).

This

situation was considered unfair by some church members as well as
nonmembers.

(.Id. at 263-78).

When Utah was accepted as a state, it included section
4 in its constitution, purportedly ending the uneasy union
between church and state.

But religion, and especially the LDS

Church, continues to play an important role in Utah today.

For

example, a recent "Time" magazine article entitled "Mixing
Business and Faith," (attached as Addendum 12), gives the LDS
Church much of the credit for Utah's healthy economy.

The

article also points out, however, that not every aspect of the
LDS Church's influence is welcome to all Utah residents or
attracts new residents.

(Id.).

Other reports, such as a
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February 1990 article in "Modern Brewery Age,H (attached as
Addendum 13), point out that the LDS Church still exerts
considerable influence in Utah politics.
While church influence in business and politics may
reasonably be viewed as constitutionally permissible and fair,
LDS Church influence in Utah's courts can only be viewed as
unconstitutional and fundamentally unfair.

Based on Utah's early

history, section 4 must have been intended to do away with any
such influence.

Moreover, sound public policy requires legal

rules that promote public faith in the fairness of the judicial
system.

Given the ever-present threat of unfair church influence

inherent in Utah's current demographic makeup, this Court should
enforce the spirit and letter of section 4 by sending a strong
signal that no such influence will be tolerated in Utah's courts.
This Court cannot send that signal if it allows Mr. Gerrish's
guilty plea to stand.
Even if this Court chooses not to presume that Mr.
Hammond's conflict of interest prejudiced Mr. Gerrish, the record
shows that Mr. Hammond's failure to determine and explain what
sentence Mr. Gerrish would face upon pleading guilty prejudiced
him.

Mr. Gerrish has repeatedly stated that he would have

insisted on a trial had he known that his sentence would be more
than three years.

(See, e.g., Addenda B at 8, M at 52-54).

Mr.

Gerrish has also consistently stated that he would have asked for
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court appointed counsel had he known that Mr. Hammond was not
competent to handle a criminal matter.

(See, e.g., Addendum B at

8, 4). 6
3.

Mr. Gerrish's Guilty Plea was not Made Knowingly
and Voluntarily Because the Sentence That Would be
Imposed was not Clearly Explained to him.

The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution and section 7 of article I of the Utah
Constitution guarantee due process of law in criminal
proceedings.

U.S. Const, amend. V; U.S. Const, amend. XIV, S 1;

Utah Const, art. I, S 7,

Rule 11(5)(e) of the Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure is designed to protect that constitutional
right.

See, e.g.. State v. Smith, 777 P.2d 464, 464 (Utah 1989).

Rule 11(5)(e) provides that a court "may not accept" a guilty
plea until the court has found that "the defendant knows the
minimum and maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him for
each offense to which a plea is entered."

Utah R. Crim. P.

11(5)(e) (identical in substance to former Utah R. Crim. P.
11(e)(5), codified at Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-ll(e)(5)(Supp 1985),
in effect at the time of Mr. Gerrish's plea).

This Court has

held that a defendant's guilty plea is not valid under rule
11(5)(e) unless the record shows that the defendant "was

6

Mr. Hammond's incompetence is demonstrated below in parts 3
and 4 of this Argument. The Utah State Bar also found that Mr.
Hammond was not competent to represent Mr. Gerrish in a criminal
matter. (Addendum 7).
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unequivocably and clearly informed about the sentence that would
be imposed."

Smith, 777 P.2d at 466. Unless a defendant has

been so informed, a guilty plea cannot be knowingly and
voluntarily made.

See id.

In Smith, this Court vacated the defendant's guilty
plea and reversed his conviction.

777 P.2d at 464, 466. The

grounds for reversal were that neither the plea affidavit nor the
transcript of the plea hearing contained language clearly and
unequivocally advising the defendant that a guilty plea would
subject him to a mandatory prison sentence of at least five
years.

See id. at 465.
The plea affidavit had four deficiencies.

First, it

"used standard language applicable to indeterminate sentences in
a situation involving a minimum mandatory term."

JEd. Such

language does not clearly state the allowable punishment.

Id.

Second, the plea affidavit was misleading because the phrase
"possible maximum sentence that can and may be imposed" indicated
that a sentence shorter than the mandatory term was possible.
Id.

Third, the affidavit's reference to a fine gave the false

impression that a fine could be imposed instead of a prison term.
Id.

Fourth, the affidavit referred to probation as if it were a

possibility even though it was not.

Id.

The transcript of the plea hearing also reflected the
likelihood that the defendant was confused about the sentence.
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Id,

The district judge explained to the defendant that the plea

H

could- subject him to a mandatory term of five, ten or fifteen

years, not that the guilty plea would automatically require him
to spend at least five years in prison.

Id.

As the following comparison demonstrates, the facts of
Smith are strikingly similar to the facts of the present case.
The pertinent portions of the plea affidavit in Smith provided as
follows:
I know that under the laws of Utah the
possible maximum sentence that can and may be
imposed upon my plea of guilty to the charge
identified on page one of this Affidavit is
as follows:
(a) Imprisonment in the Utah State Prison for
a minimum mandatory term of five, ten, or
fifteen years and which may be for life.
(b) And/or fined in any amount not in excess
of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000).

I am also aware that any charge or sentencing
concessions or recommendations for probation
or suspended sentences, including a reduction
of the charge for sentencing, made or sought
by either defense counsel or the prosecutor
are not binding on the court and may not be
approved or followed by the court.
777 P.2d at 465 (emphasis added in opinion).

The corresponding

portions of the plea affidavit Mr. Gerrish signed provide as
follows:
I have received a copy of the charge
(Information) and understand that the crime I
am pleading guilty to is a FIRST DEGREE
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FELONY and understand that the punishment for
this crime ma£ be 5, 10, OR 15 YEARS MINIMUM
MANDATORY prison term, $10,000 fine, or both.
•

• • •

I am also aware that any charge or sentencing
concessions or recommendations or probation
or suspended sentences, including a reduction
of the charges for sentencing, made or sought
by either defense counsel or counsel for the
State, is not binding on the Judge and may
not be approved by the Judge.
(Addendum 0 ) .
Mr. Gerrish's affidavit contains all four of the
deficiencies identified by this Court in Smith.

It uses standard

language applicable to indeterminate sentences that does not
clearly state the allowable punishment.

It states that the

punishment "may be" a mandatory term, indicating that a shorter
sentence was possible.

It refers to a fine in the alternative,

giving the false impression that a fine could be imposed instead
of a prison term.

It refers to probation as if it were a

possibility when it was not. Mr. Gerrish's affidavit also
contains another confusing deficiency.

It fails to state the

allowable sentence, a minimum mandatory term of three, six or
nine years.

(See Addenda 0, Q ) . Instead, it erroneously states

that the applicable sentence was a minimum mandatory term of
five, ten or fifteen years.

(Addendum 0 ) .

These ambiguities, together with Mr. Hammond's mistaken
understanding and advice to Mr. Gerrish about the potential
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sentence, created an extremely confusing situation. Mr. Hammond
not only failed to study and explain the applicable sentencing
scheme under section 76-5-404.1 to Mr. Gerrish, he erroneously
believed and told Mr. Gerrish that the sentence would be no more
than three years.

(See Addendum M at 19, 21-22, 35, 47-49).

The

confusion was compounded by Mr. Hammond's advice that Mr. Gerrish
not raise the sentencing issue in court because the Judge knew
all about the three year sentence.
67). 7

(See id. at 48, 57, 62,

Mr. Gerrish simply did not understand what sentence would

actually be imposed, and the plea hearing did not alleviate his
confusion.

(See id. at 62-64).

A comparison of the plea hearing transcripts in Smith
and the present case reveals their similarity, as well as the
additional confusion in the present case about the sentencing
provisions of section 76-5-404.1. The transcript in Smith
contains the following discussion of the sentence:
With respect to the affidavit, your
Honor, let me also point out in Paragraph 7
it specifically indicates that the punishment
for Count 1 is a minimum mandatory five, ten
or fifteen to life.
THE COURT: Do you understand what Mr.
Oehler has just said?
JOHN WHITNEY SMITH: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. And you
understand that if you plead guilty to this

7

A court "cannot . . . say that it would be obvious to a
poorly counseled defendant, that he should mention a supposed
'deal' with the government, no matter how proper." McAlenev v.
United States, 539 F.2d 282, 285 (1st Cir. 1976).
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offense, as is set out in this agreement, you
could be—submit yourself to an imprisonment
for a term—mandatory term of five, ten or
fifteen years up to life in the state
penitentiary? Do you understand that?
JOHN WHITNEY SMITH: Yes, your Honor.
777 P.2d at 465 (emphasis omitted); id* at 467 (Hall, C.J.,
dissenting)(emphasis omitted).

The transcript of Mr. Gerrish's

plea hearing contains the following discussion of the sentence:
This charge carries, according to the
statute, a minimum mandatory sentence. Have
you spoken to Mr. Hammond about the nature of
the Court's role in sentencing in this
matter? You understand that absent any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, this
Court will sentence you to prison for ten
years minimum?
[MR. GERRISH]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You understand if there are
mitigating circumstances, the Court has the
option to reduce that to a five-year minimum
sentence?
[MR. GERRISH]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Or if there are aggravating
circumstances, to increase that to 15 years
minimum?
[MR. GERRISH]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you understand what the
Court means when I say minimum? That means
the minimum amount of time you're going to
spend in the Utah State Prison before you
could even be considered before parole. Do
you understand that?
[MR. GERRISH]: Yes, I do.
(Addendum P at 4).
Although the transcript of Mr. Gerrish's hearing shows
a somewhat greater effort to explain the applicable sentencing
scheme, that effort did not go far enough to remedy the confusion
created by the ambiguous affidavit and Mr. Hammond's erroneous
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advice.

Like the affidavit, the transcript shows that Mr.

Gerrish was never told clearly and unequivocally that he would
certainly spend at least three years in prison and would most
likely serve at least six years.

In fact, Mr. Gerrish believed

that he would serve no more than three years and, like the
defendant in Smith, may even have believed that he might not
serve any time at all.

(Addendum M at 21-22, 35, 48). Like many

unsophisticated litigants, Mr.' Gerrish did not have an
independent understanding of the court proceedings and court
documents in his case.

Faced with confusing legal explanations

both in the plea affidavit and in the frightening atmosphere of
the courtroom, he could focus only on his lawyer's mistaken
advice and explanations.

(See id. at 52, 54, 57, 62-64).

On

these facts, Rule 11(5)(e) and this Court's holding in Smith
require that Mr. Gerrish's guilty plea be vacated because it was
not made knowingly and voluntarily.
4.

Mr. Gerrish's Guilty Plea was not Made Knowingly
and Voluntarily Because the State Breached its
Promise to Recommend a Three Year Sentence.

••[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to
be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be
fulfilled."

State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1275 (Utah

1988Hquoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)).
If the State breaches a promise, if the promise is illusory or if
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a defendant pleads guilty "with an exaggerated belief in the
benefits of his plea," the plea is not knowingly and voluntarily
made.

Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1273-76. Under any of these

circumstances, the plea must be vacated.

See id.

All three circumstances exist in the present case.
First, the State promised to recommend a sentence no harsher than
a minimum mandatory term of three years. Mr. Heunmond's testimony
that one of the prosecutors involved in Mr. Gerrish's case
promised to recommend a three year sentence is uncontroverted.
(See Addendum M at 21). This testimony is supported by three
additional facts.

The record shows that Mr. Hammond first

discussed the plea agreement with the prosecutor originally
assigned to the case, Ms. Lewis, but other prosecutors appeared
at the plea and sentencing hearings.

(See Addenda L, M at 20, N

at 4, P). A three year minimum mandatory term was the minimum
sentence allowed under section 76-5-404.1.

(Addendum Q).

One of

the prosecutors who appeared at the sentencing hearing, Ms.
Knight-Eagan, recommended what she mistakenly believed to be the
minimum allowable sentence, a minimum mandatory term of five
years.

(See Addendum P at 20-21).

Thus, even assuming that the

State's promise was to recommend the three year minimum mandatory
term provided for by section 76-5-404.1, rather than a term of no
more than three years as Mr. Hammond and Mr. Gerrish believed, it
is incontrovertible that the State breached its promise when Ms.
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Knight-Eagan recommended a minimum mandatory term of five
years.8
Second, the State's promise was illusory.

Section 76-

3-201(5)(a) of the Utah Code provides that "If a statute under
which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three
stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime."

Utah

Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1991)(emphasis added)(identical to
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1985), in effect at the time of
Mr. Gerrish's plea).

The transcripts of the plea and sentencing

hearings demonstrate that Judge Hanson was well aware of this
requirement and that he followed it.
22).

(See Addendum P at 4, 21-

Not surprisingly, Judge Hanson determined that the middle

term was appropriate because the only mitigating factors
presented to him, Mr. Gerrish's background as a victim of similar
abuse and Mr. Gerrish's remorse and desire for treatment,9 did

8

The record does not indicate what recommendation may have
been made in the presentence report. If the report did not make
the promised recommendation, that failure would also constitute a
breach of the State's promise. Cf.. State v. Copeland, 765 P. 2d
1266, 1274 (Utah 1988)(conflict between recommendations in report
and sentencing hearing indicated possible confusion about the
substance of the State's promise).
9

Such mitigating factors have not particularly impressed Utah
courts. See, e.g., State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989)
(affirming imposition of term of middle severity even though
defendant had sought and would continue to seek treatment and did
not understand that society condemned his actions); State v. Bell,
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not outweigh the aggravating factor of Mr. Gerrish's prior
conviction.

(See Addendum P at 16-22).

Third, Mr. Gerrish pled guilty "with an exaggerated
belief in the benefits of his plea."

Because of Mr. Hammond's

erroneous understanding and advice, Mr. Gerrish believed that he
would serve no more than three years if he pled guilty.

(See

Addendum M at 21-22, 48). But even if the State merely promised
to recommend a minimum mandatory term of three years and even if
Mr. Hammond had correctly understood and had clearly conveyed the
substance of the promise and the fact that it would not bind the
court to Mr. Gerrish, Mr. Gerrish would still have had "an
exaggerated belief in the benefit of his plea" because the
promise was illusory and because the State breached the promise.
Under these circumstances, Mr. Gerrish's plea must be vacated
because it was not knowingly and voluntarily made.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Gerrish submits that this Court should reverse the
decisions of the court of appeals and the district court
dismissing his habeas corpus petition.

Because the record

establishes that Mr. Gerrish's plea was invalid as a matter of
law and because Mr. Gerrish has already spent approximately six
years in prison as a result of that invalid plea, this Court

754 P.2d 55 (affirming imposition of term of middle severity even
though defendant, a Vietnam veteran, was a victim of posttraumatic stress disorder).
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should vacate his plea and reverse his conviction/ with
prejudice.

At the very least, this Court should reverse the

decisions of the court of appeals and the district court
dismissing the habeas corpus petition and then remand the case to
the district court with instructions to allow amendment of the
petition and to hold an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of
considering the petition's merits.
DATED this J?/T^" day of July, 1991.
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